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SLOPPINESS IN THE SUPREME COURT, 
O.T. 1935 - O.T. 1944 
Mark Tushnet * 
Recently I made a fool of myself in the pages of the New York 
Review of Books. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., had written an affec-
tionate and interesting memoir of Edward Prichard. I Among the 
anecdotes he related was one about Prichard's service as a law clerk 
to Justice Frankfurter. According to Schlesinger, Prichard had al-
lowed Frankfurter to cite an opinion that had in fact been over-
ruled; after reading the petition for rehearing, Prichard fearfully 
stayed away from the Justice's chambers. 
I had become skeptical of this kind of anecdote as a result of 
other research I had been doing.z Looking for documentary sup-
port for Schlesinger's anecdote, I examined, too briefly as it turned 
out, the back pages of the United States Reports for what seemed 
likely to be the relevant years. Failing to find either a "rehearing 
granted" or a "rehearing denied" that fit Schlesinger's description, I 
wrote a letter to the editor indicating my failure and suggesting that 
historians who rely on tales told by accomplished raconteurs should 
seek additional evidence.3 Displaying little of Frankfurter's gener-
osity towards Prichard's error in research, Schlesinger replied 
rather snippily that I had not done enough research.4 Schlesinger 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I. Schlesinger, "Prich": A New Deal Memoir, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Mar. 28, 1985, at 
21. 
2. See. e.g., Tushnet, Being First, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 n.5 (1985). Perhaps 
the best example comes from R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 266 (1975), which relies on 
Thurgood Marshall, an accomplished raconteur, to assert that, in McLaurin v. Board of 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the NAACP "deliberately picked Professor McLaurin [as the 
plaintiff in the suit to desegregate the graduate school at the University of Oklahoma] because 
he was sixty-eight years old and we didn't think he was going to marry or intermarry .... " 
In fact, McLaurin and five other blacks had approached the NAACP to express interest in 
beginning a desegregation suit, and there seems to have been no selection at all. See G. 
CROSS, BLACKS IN WHITE COLLEGES 30-49 (1975). (Cross was the President of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma when McLaurin was brought.) 
3. Tushnet, Letter to Editor, N.Y. Rev. of Books, May 30, 1985, at 52. 
4. !d. Schlesinger's memoir had been fuzzy on the relevant dates, which complicated 
my inquiry. And, in the end, I considered that I had done enough research for a letter to the 
editor which asserted only that I had failed to find support for the story, not that the story 
was false. But the fact remains, I screwed up. 
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had called Joseph Raub, who supplied him with the relevant 
citation.s 
Properly chastised, I decided to do some more research, having 
been struck by the number of cases in which the Court had ordered 
changes made in its already issued opinions. This comment reports 
on the results of an inquiry into some aspects of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking between 1935 and 1945.6 The Court during this pe-
riod ordered two kinds of changes in what it had already done:7 
revisions in published opinions and grants of rehearing after previ-
ous denials of review. It seemed to me that the present Court rarely 
made such changes, 8 and that there should be some reason for this 
apparent shift in the quality of the decisionmaking process. The 
first section of this comment simply catalogues the kinds of changes 
the Court ordered. Next I explore some possible reasons for the 
pattern of sloppiness in decisionmaking; these explanations are 
based in large measure of the Court's underdeveloped bureaucracy 
in the 1930's and 1940's. Finally, I ask whether any broader con-
clusions can be drawn from this historical inquiry; as it turns out, 
the Court's behavior illuminates some aspects of judicial strategy 
and, I believe, of jurisprudence as well. 
I. A CATALOGUE OF SLOPPINESS 
A. CHANGES IN OPINIONS 
Changes in opinions themselves fall into two general catego-
ries. The first group includes cases in which the Court ordered rela-
tively small changes in the statement of the facts or in its 
characterization of some prior case. For example, Bonet v. Yabucoa 
Sugar Co. 9 involved interpretation of Puerto Rico's tax law. At first 
Justice Black's opinion for the Court described the tax law as pro-
viding for a "refund" under specified circumstances; the modified 
5. Actually, Schlesinger screwed up too, though less seriously. His reply cited 
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940), and quoted what 
"Justice Frankfurter wrote in an opinion delivered on January 15, 1940." Schlesinger then 
quoted the Court's order withdrawing its prior opinion, which order appears at 308 U.S. 530 
(1939). 
6. I selected those dates so that my research would cover the transition from the pre· 
New Deal Court to the Roosevelt Court, to see whether instability in the Court's membership 
had any discernible consequences. 
7. I refer to changes made by formal order of the Court and reported as such in the 
order list. For later developments, see infra text accompanying notes 34-39. 
8. For example, since 1981 the Court has granted rehearing after a previous denial of 
review in only four cases. For discussion, see infra note 41. An informal survey of nine 
colleagues who clerked for Supreme Court Justice since 1960 revealed one instance of "fixing 
up a little bit a badly botched metaphor" at the Reporter's initiative. 
9. 305 u.s. 505 (1939). 
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optmon said the law provided for "relief' under those circum-
stances. w In another set of cases, the Court modified its summary of 
the disposition, to narrow the issues open on remand. For example, 
in United States v. McShain, the disposition was modified to limit 
the Court's reversal of the Court of Claims to the single item at 
issue rather than encompassing the judgment as a whole. 11 
In another, more significant group of cases, the Court's modifi-
cations went to matters of substance. These range from the rela-
tively minor to the rather important.I2 Minor alterations include 
10. 307 U.S. 613 (1939). See also Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U.S. 602 (1942), amending 
description of statute in 317 U.S. 217 (1942); United States v. New York, 316 U.S. 643 
(1942), altering "sum of assets available" to "total of such claims" in 315 U.S. 510 (1942); 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 315 U.S. 788 (1942), amending description of Clayton 
Act in 314 U.S. 488 (1942); United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, S.P. & P.R. Co., 313 U.S. 
543 (1941), amending statement of claims in 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Fashion Originators' Guild 
of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 668 (1941), amending statement of facts in 
312 U.S. 457 (1941); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 668 (1941), 
amending statement of facts in 312 U.S. 410 (1941); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 657 
(1941), expanding description of statute in 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 
312 U.S. 656 (1941), amending statement of party's contention in 312 U.S. 168 (1941); Schri-
ber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 312 U.S. 654 (1940), modifying description of prior 
litigation in 311 U.S. 211 (1940); Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 521 (I 939), changing summary 
description of statute in 308 U.S. 57 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 
618 (1939), modifying statement of facts in 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Mackay Radio & Telegraph 
Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 618 (1939), modifying description of patents at issue 
in 306 U.S. 86 (1939); Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 573 (1938), 
modifying statement of facts in 305 U.S. 47 (1938); Lone Star Gas v. Texas, 304 U.S. 551 
(1938), changing "interstate" to "intrastate" in 304 U.S. 224 (I 938); General Talking Pic-
tures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 546 (1938), modifying summary of facts in 304 
U.S. 175 (1938); United Public Gas Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 625 (1938), adding qualify-
ing clause to 303 U.S. 123 (1938), indicating that special issues submitted to jury addressed 
some, but not all, of issues that jury should have considered; Groman v. Commissioner, 302 
U.S. 654 (1937), striking phrase "Glidden transferred nothing to them" in description of facts 
in 302 U.S. 82 (1937); Stone v. White, 302 U.S. 639 (1937), "recast[ing]" statement of facts in 
301 U.S. 532 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 672 (1937), modifying statement of facts, 
and changing description of request for relief from "decree for an injunction" to "equitable 
remedy" in 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co., 300 U.S. 636 (1937), modify-
ing statement of facts in 299 U.S. 456 (1937); Helvering v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 299 U.S. 516 
(1936), modifying 299 U.S. 88 (1936), to replace "unmatured" with "matured" in characteri-
zation of prior holding; Legg v. St. John, 297 U.S. 695 (1936), modifying 296 U.S. 489 (1936), 
to say that cash surrender value was "a common incident" of, rather than "a recognized 
incident" of legal reserve life insurance. As we will see, the Court's practice in later years 
makes it difficult to identify precisely what modifications it made by order. 
II. 308 U.S. 520 (1939), modifying 308 U.S. 512 (1939). See also Nathanson v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 746 (1944); Adams v. McCann, 317 U.S. 605 (1942); Seminole Nation v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 647, 651 (1942); Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 
613, 616 (1939); Eichholz v. Public Service Comm'n, 306 U.S. 622 (1939); Schriber-Schroth 
Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 573 (1938); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 640 (1937), changing 
"The allegations ... differ in wme particulars; but whether these differences will affect the 
final disposition of the so [sic] suits as to require unlike decrees, we do not determine," to 
"whether these differences will affect the extent or measure of the rights of the respective 
respondents or the final disposition of the suits so as to require unlike decrees." 
12. I must note that sometimes it is impossible to determine the exact significance of a 
modification. For example, the order in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 304 
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striking the phrase "it is conceded that," thus converting a conces-
sion by a party into a determination by the Court.B The opinion in 
Smith v. Allwright 14 was modified to change the characterization of 
the right to vote from "the great privilege of choosing his rulers," 
reminiscent of Hamilton, to the less elitist "great privilege of the 
ballot. "15 The Court avoided embarrassment by striking the state-
ment that Justice Frankfurter did not participate in the decision in 
NLRB v. Fainblatt, a case in which he did indeed participate.16 
Revisions in other cases were more obviously substantive. 
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station 11 raised two issues. The stat-
utes regulating the ownership of radio stations were designed to 
serve the public interest. The first issue in Sanders Bros. was 
whether an owner's economic interest in avoiding competition was 
an element to be considered in determining the public interest. The 
Court said that it was not. The second issue was whether an owner 
who might be faced with economic injury had standing to raise 
other elements of the public interest. The Court said the owner did 
have standing. In describing the holding, the Court's opinion ini-
tially said only that "one likely to be injured" had standing to assert 
the public interest, which is insufficient to decide the case. The 
opinion was therefore modified to say that "one likely to be finan-
cially injured" had standing.1s 
U.S. 542 (1938), is so substantial as to seem substantive, but without comparing the slip 
opinion to the published version, I cannot determine the scope of the changes. See also 
United States v. Meyers, 321 U.S. 750 (1944); Northwestern Electric Co. v. Federal Power 
Comm'n, 321 U.S. 748 (1944); Hysler v. Florida, 316 U.S. 642 (1942), apparently modifying 
statement of facts regarding coerced confession in 315 U.S. 411 (1942); Cudahy Packing Co. 
v. Holland, 315 U.S. 788 (1942), striking footnotes from 315 U.S. 357 (1942). 
13. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 626 (1940). See also Missouri-Kansas 
Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 665 (1941), striking "so it was claimed" from 312 
U.S. 502 (1941); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 668 (1941), striking "and do not appear to be 
disputed here" from 312 U.S. 383 (1941). An example of the reverse phenomenon, a modifi-
cation restricting the scope of the Court's decision, is Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 
U.S. 657 (1941), adding the phrase "On the record before us" in discussion of propriety of 
agency's definition of industry at 312 U.S. 126, 149 (1941). 
14. 321 u.s. 649, 662 (1944). 
15. 322 U.S. 718 (1944). See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969), quoting 
Hamilton on the people's right to "choose whom they please to govern them." A similar 
arguably stylistic alteration occurred in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 744 
(1943), which struck the sentence "Its facts [i.e., those of another circuit court decision] are 
practically on all fours with those of the present case" from 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
16. 307 u.s. 609 (1939). 
17. 309 u.s. 470 (1940). 
18. 309 U.S. 642 (1940). See also Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 649 (1942), 
changing statement about "use" of stockyards to "establish[ing] or becom[ing] interested in" 
stockyards, thus expanding scope of 316 U.S. 216 (1942). Similarly, Justice Frankfurter was 
forced to retract an unacceptable statement about statutory interpretation in Toucey v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., where the Court changed the statement that the rationale of certain deci-
sions was that "the Removal Acts have pro tanto amended" the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793, 
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Two cases illustrate the Court's handling of issues about the 
interaction between congressional power to regulate interstate com-
merce and state power over the same commerce. By the mid-
1930's, Congress had the undisputed power to preempt state regula-
tions of interstate commerce even if those regulations were justified 
on the ground that they promoted important health and safety in-
terests of local residents. Thus, any challenge to state authority to 
regulate required consideration of the scope of congressional action 
in the area. For example, South Carolina State Highway Depart-
ment v. Barnwell Bros. ,t9 a celebrated case, involved South Caro-
lina's effort to impose weight and size limitations on trucks using its 
highways. There was some congressional action regarding truck 
use of highways, and Barnwell Brothers might have claimed that 
Congress had preempted state regulation of weight and size. In its 
initial opinion in the case, the Court held that Congress had not 
preempted such regulation, writing, "But as the district court held, 
Congress has not undertaken to regulate" those matters. Appar-
ently concerned that this holding was not a fully considered one, the 
Court later modified the opinion to say, "But appellees do not chal-
lenge here the ruling of the district court that Congress has not un-
dertaken to regulate. "2o 
A similar issue arose in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,21 but 
here a divided Court held that Congress had preempted state regu-
lation. The majority opinion initially stated that "the entire process 
of manufacture [in the regulated field] comes under federal supervi-
sion," that federal agents "watch" the process, and that manufac-
turing here was "subjected to" federal scrutiny. State officials 
contacted the Department of Agriculture, the federal regulatory au-
thority, and persuaded the Department's Solicitor to ask the Solici-
tor General to support a petition for rehearing. The Department of 
Agriculture stated that the Court appeared to believe that it in-
spected the entire manufacturing process continuously. In fact, 
however, the Department had only one inspector, who went into 
the field at four to six weeks intervals.22 The Court denied rehear-
ing, but modified its opinion to state that the manufacturing process 
to a statement that the Acts "qualify pro tanto" the Anti-Injunction Act. 314 U.S. 585 
(1941), amending 314 U.S. 118 (1941). See also Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 550 (1941), 
rewriting prior opinion discussing reasons for avoiding merits, and role of Rule 53 in the case; 
L.T. Barringer & Co. v. United States, l19 U.S. 729 (1943), adding paragraph to end of 319 
U.S. I (1943), stating that Coun had considered the sufficiency of the evidence and found it 
adequate to suppon judgment. 
19. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
20. 303 u.s. 625 (1938). 
21. 315 u.s. 148 (1942). 
22. Mastin G. White, Solicitor, Depanment of Agriculture, to Charles Fahy, Solicitor 
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"is subject to" federal supervision, that the Department of Agricul-
ture "has authority to watch" the process, and that the process was 
"subject to" federal inspection. The effect of these changes is sub-
stantial: the Court found preemption even though the Department 
was not exercising its authority to inspect, thus leaving the area en-
tirely unregulated as a practical matter, the state's authority being 
preempted and the federal authority going unexercised. 
In another celebrated case, Sibbach v. Wilson,23 the Court up-
held a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing a 
court to require that a plaintiff submit to a physical examination. 
The plaintiff claimed that requiring a physical examination altered a 
substantive privacy right, in violation of the Rules Enabling Act, 
which bars rules altering substantive rights. After disposing of the 
claim that she had some general privacy right, Justice Roberts's 
opinion for the court turned to the Rules Enabling Act issue. Origi-
nally, the opinion offered two reasons for finding no violation of the 
Enabling Act: first, that, as the prior analysis showed, no privacy 
right· was invaded, and, second, that "a litigant need not resort to 
the federal courts unless willing to comply with the rule." This is a 
fairly standard use of the right-privilege distinction: one who seeks 
to enjoy a privilege must comply with the conditions attached to its 
exercise. But the Court must have been troubled by the implication 
that the use of the federal courts in a diversity case was a privilege, 
for it ordered this alternative justification deleted from the 
opinion.24 
B. GRANTS OF REVIEW 
The second large category of apparent errors by the Court in-
cluded cases granting review after it had been previously denied. 
These cases fall into two groups. As it turns out, the first group 
does not involve "errors" of the sort I have already discussed, but 
the Court's disposition of the cases does reveal something about the 
decisional process in the 1940's. This group contains cases in which 
rehearing was granted because a conflict in the circuits developed 
after the denial of review. The second group of cases involves some-
thing akin to "errors," and these too are revealing. 
General, Feb. 17, 1942, in Box 67, Cloverleaf Butter file, Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
23. 312 u.s. 1 (1940). 
24. 312 U.S. 655 (1941). A modified version of Justice Roberts's thought made an ap-
pearance recently in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1984), i~ which the 
Court wrote that "as the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legtslature, the 
processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment 
right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit." 
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The Court sometimes granted review when, after a previous 
denial, a conflict in the circuits developed. For example, review was 
denied on January 15, 1940, in Crane-Johnson Co. v. Helvering,2s 
six weeks before a different circuit expressly rejected the reasoning 
in the lower court's opinion in Crane-Johnson. The Court granted 
rehearing, vacated the previous denial of review, and subsequently 
affirmed the decision below.26 This procedure seems straightfor-
ward enough, but, as I will argue in the next section, it does illumi-
nate some aspects of the Court's conception of its role. 
More interesting are the cases of true "errors." Here the Court 
denied review on procedural grounds; for example, that the federal 
question had not been properly presented in the lower courts,21 or 
that the decision below was not fina1.2s Petitions for rehearing per-
suaded the Court that the procedural defects did not actually exist, 
and the Court then considered the petition for review on the merits. 
I call these cases of error because, in most instances, the petitions 
for rehearing did not say very much new. In one,29 the petition for 
rehearing demonstrated the error by merely quoting from the lower 
court opinions. 
25. 308 u.s. 627 (1940). 
26. 311 U.S. 54 (1940). See also Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, cert. de-
nied, 319 U.S. 758, reh'g and cert. granted, 319 U.S. 778, 320 U.S. 422 (1943); Neuberger v. 
Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83 (1940), (cert. denied, 308 U.S. 623, Jan. 2, 1940; conflict arose 
Feb. 5, 1940; reh'g and cert. granted, 310 U.S. 655, May 27, 1940); New World Life Ins. Co. 
v. United States, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 612 (1939), reh'g and cert. granted, 310 U.S. 654, 311 
U.S. 620 (1940); Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436, 438 (1939). For similar examples 
with respect to conflicts about the validity of particular patents, see Automatic Devices Corp. 
v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 312 U.S. 711 (1941); Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, 
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 600, reh'g and cert. granted, 305 U.S. 667 (1938), 307 U.S. 350 (1939). 
A variant is Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 50 (1938), where the 
Sixth Circuit had upheld the validity of a patent used primarily in that circuit, the alleged 
infringer said that the patent holder had the opportunity to challenge the patent in other 
circuits but failed to do so, the holder responded at first that it was waiting for the proper 
occasion, and the infringer filed a motion for leave to file a second petition for rehearing 
when, seven months after the first, the holder had done nothing to challenge infringements in 
other circuits. A similar case is Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 128 
(1942), where the petition for rehearing pointed out that I 00% of the goods using the patent 
were made in the Seventh Circuit, thus eliminating the possibility that a conflict would arise. 
See also Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., cert. denied, 308 U.S. 613, reh'g and cert. 
granted, 308 U.S. 630 (1939), 309 U.S. 478 (1940), in which a conflict arose between the 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits over the proper interpretation, under Illinois law, of certain 
deeds to the same tract of land; the conflict arose on November 6, 1939, and review was 
initially denied on November 22, presumably too soon for the conflict to have registered on 
the Court's processes. 
27. See, e.g., Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 319 U.S. 753 (1943). 
28. See, e.g., Brady v. Terminal Rwy. Ass'n, 302 U.S. 688 (1937). 
29. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 319 U.S. 778 (1943). 
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II. ACCOUNTING FOR SLOPPINESS 
The pages of today's United States Reports are not sprinkled 
with orders granting rehearing or correcting prior mistakes. One 
reason may be that the increasing bureaucratization of the Court 
has reduced the chance that errors will find their way into slip opin-
ions or preliminary prints of decisions and has allowed the Court to 
develop alternative methods of correcting those errors that do oc-
cur. If so, this might reduce concern that bureaucratization of the 
courts is undesirable.3o 
We can begin by distinguishing between the bureaucratization 
of the chambers of the Justices and that of the Court as an institu-
tion. With respect to the former, two points seem particularly im-
portant. First, the time between argument and decision has 
lengthened. In many instances, opinions were handed down in the 
1930's and 1940's within a month of argument.3I Today, opinions 
routinely take several months before they emerge.32 Obviously, 
time pressure reduces the possibility that minor errors will be de-
tected before an opinion is released. On the other hand, because 
review is so rarely granted today, it makes little sense to single out a 
procedural ground for denial. Thus, the Court's orders denying re-
view do not give litigants the opportunity to write a petition for 
rehearing correcting the Court's misimpression about the case's 
procedural posture. 
Second, the staff in each chambers has increased, and the Jus-
tices now delegate substantial authority in drafting and revising 
opinions to their law clerks. This has several effects. Within each 
chambers, more people examine an opinion before it goes out, pro-
viding several points at which errors might be detected. More inter-
esting, perhaps, is the psychological fact signalled by the anecdote 
about Prichard that provoked my research. Law clerks are rela-
tively young people, who are probably in their first important posi-
tion. It is also a position something akin to serfdom, in which the 
employee is subject to rather direct personal supervision by a much 
more important person. Law clerks who draft and revise opinions 
are therefore likely to be rather painstaking about their jobs. In 
contrast, the Justices are, in the main, people who have held high 
30. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS (1985). Jay, Book Review, 73 GEO 
L.J. 1507 (1985), points out that though Posner treats bureaucratization as an almost unal-
loyed evil, he neither provides nor uses a consistent definition of bureaucracy. 
31. See, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941) (argued Jan. 9, decided 
Feb. 3); United States v. McShain, 308 U.S. 512 (1939) (argued Oct. 20, decided Nov. 6); 
Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) (argued Oct. 21-22, decided Nov. 8). 
32. For example, during the 1983 Term, only four opinions, all in cases argued in early 
October, were issued before January I. 
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positions before, for whom the job of Justice of the Supreme Court 
is on some level merely another high position. When such people 
spend their time drafting opinions, as did the Justices in the 1930's 
and 1940's, I suspect that they are likely to be relatively inattentive 
to detail. Finally, of course, there is the inevitable fact that no one 
is perfect: even Homer, or Justice Frankfurter, sometimes nods. 
The bureaucratization of the Court as an institution also may 
affect the rate at which errors occur. Here one relevant subdivision 
of the Court is the office of the Reporter. What seems to have oc-
curred is a delegation of authority from the Court as a whole to a 
specialized subdivision. As it happens, this delegation seems to 
have begun in the mid-1940's. 
Ernest Knaebel had been Reporter from the 1916 Term of the 
Court.33 Until the 1940's, the Reporter apparently had authority to 
correct typographical errors and identify them on an "errata" 
page.34 But more substantive modifications in opinions had to be 
made by order of the Court. Knaebel retired in 1944, his name last 
appearing as Reporter in volume 321 of the United States Reports. 
Not until volume 326 does the name of a new Reporter, Walter 
Wyatt, appear. In the interim the Court changed its practices. It 
still was necessary that modifications in opinions be made by order 
of the Court. But instead of indicating what the changes were, the 
order began to read, "Order entered amending the opinion in this 
case."Js Sometimes these changes were substantive. For example, 
in United States v. Saylor,36 the opinion was "inaccurate in attribut-
ing to the defendant election officials the duty to count the votes, as 
well as to receive and return them." Instead of noting the scope of 
the changes in the order, the Court made a journal entry indicating 
that specified changes were made with the agreement of the Justices 
who joined in the opinion.37 With the arrival of a new and obvi-
ously vigorous Reporter, it seems likely that even more was dele-
gated to that office.Js Today the Reporter's office undoubtedly 
corrects opinions, with the agreement of the Justices, as a routine 
33. His name first appears on the title page of 242 U.S. 
34. See, e.g., 299 U.S. ii (1937). 
35. The first such order I have found is United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 718 (1944). 
36. 322 U.S. 385 (1944). 
37. See Owen Roberts to Chief Justice, copies to the Court, Box 109, United States v. 
Saylor file, Wiley B. Rutledge Papers, Library of Congress. 
38. Wyatt's vigor is revealed in letters he sent to Justice Rutledge and other members of 
the Court. See Reporter file, Box 156, Wiley B. Rutledge Papers. For example, Wyatt ob-
tained and sent to each chambers copies of the Harvard Uniform System of Citation, to stand-
ardize practices. Wyatt to Rutledge, Mar. 3, 1947. Jd. 
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matter.39 
The Court itself has changed in ways that have affected its 
practices regarding rehearings. In the 1940's, the Court granted re-
hearings when a subsequent circuit court decision created a conflict. 
It justified its practice on the ground that review "enables us to do 
justice to the party if it appears that he has the right of the contro-
versy. "40 Yet it is striking that the Court almost invariably affirmed 
the decision of the court below. Thus, its prior denial actually 
would not have done an injustice to the party had the Court waited 
until the conflict-creating decision was presented to it for review. 
Apparently, the Court desired to clarify these areas-which tended 
to involve patents or taxes-at the first opportunity. In the 1940's 
the Court seemingly believed that the interim costs of waiting until 
the conflict-creating decision was presented for review exceeded the 
institutional burdens on the Court caused by its obvious receptivity 
to the practice of petitioning for rehearing. As the Court's caseload 
increased, the balance shifted, the costs of considering petitions for 
rehearing now outweighing the costs of waiting until the second 
case reached the Court.4t 
The gradual transformation of the Court's practices regarding 
correction of its errors indicates that the Court is becoming more 
like the other bureaucracies of modern American government, a 
process that has its benefits as well as its costs. But can we see 
anything further about the Court's decisionmaking processes in 
these materials? 
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING: STRATEGY 
AND JURISPRUDENCE 
Because I teach the course in federal jurisdiction, I found the 
39. See, e.g., Dressler, A Lesson in Caution, Overwork, and Fatigue: The Judicial Mis-
craftsmanship of Segura v. United States, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 407 (1985). 
40. R. Simpson & Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 225, 229 (1944). 
41. Since 1981 the Court has granted rehearings in four cases. In each the Court va-
cated its prior denial of review and remanded for reconsideration in light of one of its own 
recent decisions. Leverson v. Conway, 105 S. Ct. 3471 (1985); California v. Howard, 105 S. 
Ct. 64 (1984); Simmons v. Sea-Land Services, 462 U.S. 1114 (1983); Florida v. Rodriguez, 
461 U.S. 940 (1983). In all but Simmons, the Court had reversed the decision to which 
attention was directed. In three of the cases, there was a relatively short interval between the 
denial of review in one case and the granting of review in the other. (In Leverson, review was 
initially denied in October 29, 1984, and review granted in the parallel case on December 10; 
in Simmons, the dates are October 12, 1982 and November 15; and in Rodriguez, they are 
May 26, 1981 and November 30, a period extended by the summer recess.) However, in 
Howard, review was initially denied on April 30, 1984 and rehearing granted on October I, 
vacating and remanding for consideration in light of a case decided on July 6, 1983. Presum-
ably this is what led Justice White, who had joined in the July 6 decision, to dissent from the 
grant of rehearing. 
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substantive revision in Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil 
Co.42 most striking. The Texas Railroad Commission, as students 
of federal jurisdiction know from Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,4 3 regu-
lated the amount of oil that could be taken from each well in an oil 
field. Rowan & Nichols were unsatisfied with the allocation they 
received from the Commission. They sought a federal injunction 
against the allocation on the ground that it was so low as to deprive 
them of their property in violation of both the due process clause 
and a Texas statute requiring that allocations be on a "reasonable 
basis." The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, had no 
difficulty rejecting the constitutional claim. In the course of the 
opinion, the following remarkable sentence appears: 
Except where the jurisdiction rests, as it does not here, on diversity of citizenship, 
the only question open to a federal tribunal is whether the state action complained 
of has transgressed whatever restrictions the vague contours of the Due Process 
Clause may place upon the exercise of the state's regulatory power.44 
This denies the existence of a doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, es-
tablished in the Court since at least 1909.4s What could Justice 
Frankfurter, a specialist in federal jurisdiction, have been thinking 
about? 
Frankfurter was not opposed to the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction per se, and the Court properly modified its opinion to delete 
the sentence casting doubt on the doctrine. In its place it substi-
tuted an analysis of the Texas law. The modified opinion concluded 
that the standard for determining when an allocation was reason-
able under Texas law was identical to the federal due process 
standard. 
What ought not to be done by the federal courts when the Due Process Clause 
is invoked ought not to be attempted by these courts under the guise of enforcing a 
state statute. Whether the respondents may still have a remedy in the state courts is 
for the Texas courts to determine, and is not foreclosed by the denial ... of an 
injunction in the federal courts.46 
The modification directs our attention to the Court's concern about 
the use of substantive due process to interfere with state economic 
regulation. 
Several letters between members of the Court suggest that 
Frankfurter's initial effort in Rowan & Nichols was aimed at limit-
42. 310 u.s. 573 (1940). 
43. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). As we will see, this citation is not entirely irrelevant to the 
story. 
44. 310 U.S. at 580. 
45. Siler v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). 
46. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 614, 615 (1940). 
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ing the scope of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, not at eliminat-
ing it entirely. Shortly after the opinion was revised, Harlan Fiske 
Stone wrote Frankfurter that, in his view, 
[W]e have not exposed fully enough our reasons for not dealing with the state ques-
tion. . . . [W]here relief is sought in equity the federal courts do not have to give 
relief on the basis of state law where the plaintiff fails to show what the state law is 
or that it adopts any ascertainable standard on the basis of which relief should be 
given. I hope some day the Court will be persuaded to say just that or its 
equivalent. 4 7 
That is, pendent jurisdiction should be denied where the litigant 
seeks to use a state law that resembles the "vague contours" of the 
due process clause. In this connection it may not be amiss to note 
that the Court created the doctrine of abstention in cases involving 
unclear state statutes one year later.4s 
While Frankfurter was attempting to draft an appropriate revi-
sion of the opinion in Rowan & Nichols , he wrote Stone that he had 
spent "literally hours of discussion" with Justice Hugo Black on the 
proper phrasing.49 Black, too, was concerned about the use of the 
federal courts to enforce economic due process. During the same 
year, the Court struggled with the opinion in Beal v. Missouri Pa-
cific R.R. Co. ,so in which the scope of the doctrine of Ex parte 
Youngs! was at issue. Young had held that federal injunctive relief 
was available to enjoin a state officer from enforcing a state law, 
notwithstanding the eleventh amendment, where the enforcement 
threatened a sufficiently grave harm. In Young, the Court identified 
one form of grave harm as the presence in the statute of a penalty 
structure so severe as to deter any reasonable person from seeking 
to challenge the statute by disobeying it and interposing his or her 
federal claims as a defense to a prosecution. In Bea/, the plaintiff's 
lawyer apparently represented to the Court that the state had 
agreed to treat a single prosecution as a test case to determine the 
constitutionality of the state's regulation. The Court relied on this 
representation to find that the standard required by Young had not 
been met. But the opinion contained a reference that might have 
been read to approve the general doctrine of Ex parte Young. Jus-
tice Black objected to that: "Personally I would have preferred that 
nothing be said which required the citation of Ex parte Young. . . . I 
47. Stone to Frankfurter, Jan. 1, 1941, Box 74, Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols 
file, Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress. 
48. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
49. Frankfurter to Stone, Oct. 17, 1940, Box 74, Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols 
file, Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress. 
50. 312 U.S. 45 (1941), decided Jan. 20. 
51. 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
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do not agree with the discussion ... on the point for which [it is] 
cited ... . "s2 
Taking these bits of information together, we can see that 
Rowan & Nichols is part of a larger picture, the struggle on the part 
of some Justices to develop an appropriate method for interring the 
doctrine of economic due process. Of course they were engaged in 
attacking the doctrine directly, and one might have thought that by 
1940 the attack had succeeded. But lower court judges do not al-
ways get the message from the Supreme Court and sometimes enter 
judgments that, as a practical matter, the Court could not review. 
Thus, the Justices sought to develop a set of jurisdictional doctrines 
that would reinforce the substantive law they were developing.s3 
Frankfurter slipped in Rowan & Nichols by overstating the limita-
tion that he wished to place on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 
But his error, and the way it fits into a wider picture, reminds us 
that substantive and jurisdictional doctrine go hand in hand.s4 
Something similar occurred in Buchalter v. New York.ss 
Buchalter and two other notorious figures associated with organized 
crime were sentenced to death for arranging and carrying out a 
mob-connected murder. Numerous trial errors had occurred in the 
midst of a public outcry against the defendants. After review was 
denied, Justice Frankfurter prepared a memorandum quoting exten-
sively from the petition for rehearing. He was, he said, uncomforta-
ble with refusing to review a capital case in which such errors were 
alleged to have occurred.s6 Today this memorandum would proba-
bly appear as a dissent from denial of review, but in the 1940's it 
occasioned a rehearing. After the Court heard argument, it af-
firmed the convictions on the ground that the trial errors did not 
amount to a violation of fundamental fairness and so did not violate 
the Constitution.s7 At the end of the opinion, Justice Black noted 
52. Hugo Black to Stone, Jan. 2, 1940, Box 261, Opinions of Other Judges file, Hugo L. 
Black Papers, Library of Congress. 
53. See also Laycock, Federal Interference With State Prosecutions: The Cases Dom-
browski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1979). 
54. Obviously a more recent example, drawn from the same area, is the Court's restric-
tion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), which surely is explicable more by the Court's discomfort with struc-
tural relief in cases challenging the on-going operations of the large-scale institutions of the 
bureaucratic state than it is by concern for an appropriate allocation of business (in the ab-
stract) between federal and state courts. See Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984). See also Allen v. Wright, 104 S. 
Ct. 3315 (1984). 
55. 318 u.s. 766 (1943). 
56. See Memorandum of Justice Frankfurter, Buchalter v. New York, Miscellany File, 
Box 75, Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress. 
57. 319 u.s. 427 (1943). 
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that he would have dismissed the grant of review. Surely here was a 
preview of the controversy over the proper scope of the due process 
clause that erupted more visibly in Adamson v. Californiass and 
subsequent cases.s9 
Uncertainty or disagreement about substantive doctrine thus 
appears to have caused some of the sloppiness in the Court's work. 
It seems that uncertainty also affected the rehearing process, not 
just by inducing members of the Court to reconsider their positions 
on the merits, but also by allowing them to reconsider preliminary 
procedural points. Here it seems significant that a number of the 
"errors" regarding the proper presentation of the federal question 
occurred in cases raising contentious issues about the constitutional 
limits on state authority to regulate picketing by labor unions.60 
Plainly the concept of the "proper" presentation of a federal ques-
tion was flexible enough to let a Justice use the requirement first to 
avoid a difficult case and then, on reconsideration, to decide it on 
the merits.6' 
Finally we come to the case that started me off. Oklahoma 
Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.62 was a "rate contro-
versy,"63 which, as the discussion of Rowan & Nichols suggests, 
may be significant. Oklahoma Gas & Electric challenged a rate de-
termination by appealing to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which 
rejected the challenge in 1930. Pending that decision, Oklahoma 
Gas & Electric had given a bond. After the challenge was rejected, 
58. 332 u.s. 46 (1947). 
59. Something similar might have occurred in Robinson v. United States, cert. denied, 
323 U.S. 789 (1944), reh'g and cert. granted, 323 U.S. 808, 324 U.S. 282 (1945), also a capital 
case. See also Vernon v. Alabama, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 694 (1940), reh'g, and cert. granted, 
313 U.S. 540, summarily rev'd, 313 U.S. 547 (1941). These cases might illustrate a judgment 
by the Court that "important" cases not otherwise satisfying the requirements for discretion-
ary review ought to be heard. For what might conceivably be a similar case, see Kellogg Co. 
v. National Biscuit Co., cert. denied, 302 U.S. 733, reh'g denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937), reh'g 
and cert. granted, 304 U.S. 586, rev'd, 305 U.S. Ill (1938), in which the petition for rehearing 
provided no new information but simply stressed the importance of the case to consumers of 
shredded wheat. 
60. See, e.g., Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 572, reh'g 
and cert. granted, and judgment rev'd summarily, 313 U.S. 548, relr'g granted, 314 U.S. 704 
(1941), rev'd, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, cert. 
denied, 308 U.S. 596 (1939), reh'g and cert. granted, 310 U.S. 655 (1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 287 
(1941). See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 n.2 (1943). 
61. The papers available to me leave inexplicable some of the grants of rehearing, in 
cases where the petitions presented nothing that did not appear in the original request for 
review. See, e.g., McCullough Co. v. Kammerer Corp., 323 U.S. 327 (1945), dismissing cert., 
on the ground that the issue on which review was granted had not been presented on the 
record; Crenshaw v. United States, cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703, reh'g and cert. granted, 313 
U.S. 596, dismissed by stipulation, 314 U.S. 702 (1941). 
62. 309 u.s. 4 (1940). 
63. /d. at 5. 
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a beneficiary of the bond sued in state court. Attempting to secure a 
federal determination of the validity of the rate order, Oklahoma 
Gas & Electric filed suit in the federal district court, seeking a dec-
laration of the order's invalidity, an injunction against its enforce-
ment, and an injunction against the action seeking to enforce the 
bond. Eventually, in 1938 the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court's decision granting the requested relief. 
The case presented three issues. First, the Court held, relying 
on a recent case, that venue was proper in Oklahoma because of the 
defendant's appointment of an agent for service of process there. 
Second, the Court addressed a plea of res judicata. The validity of 
that plea depended on the characterization of the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court's 1930 decision. If that decision was made in the 
court's "legislative" capacity, it was not a judgment to which res 
judicata attached.64 Not until 1935 did the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court hold that its rate decisions were made in its judicial capacity. 
The consequence of that decision, if applied retroactively, was to 
confer preclusive effect on the 1930 decision, despite the inability of 
Oklahoma Gas & Electric to anticipate that holding. Third, the 
Court had to decide whether the injunction against the enforcement 
of the bond violated the Anti-Injunction Act.65 
Justice Frankfurter (or perhaps Prichard) was obviously taken 
with the retroactivity issue. He wrote an opinion exploring the ju-
risprudence of retroactivity in some detail, attempting to show that 
invoking res judicata imposed no substantial hardship on Oklahoma 
Gas & Electric. Because the 1935 decision "did not profess to make 
new law or to change the old," what happened to Oklahoma Gas & 
Electric was "part of the price paid for the overriding benefits of a 
system of justice based on more or less general principles as against 
ad hoc determinations." He cited Gelpcke v. Dubuque 66 in support 
of the claim that refusing to "adhere to a state court's declaration of 
its own law even though it has had a checkered unfolding" pro-
duced a "discouraging history of ... juristic sport."67 Chief Justice 
Hughes, joined by Justices McReynolds and Roberts, disagreed 
with this analysis, finding "manifest injustice" in holding Oklahoma 
Gas & Electric to be bound by a decision rendered three years after 
its lawsuit had been filed. He would have interpreted the Oklahoma 
64. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). 
65. 28 u.s.c. § 2283. 
66. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175 (1863). 
67. 309 U.S. at 706 (appendix to volume). The opinion then disposed of an objection to 
its res judicata analysis based on an intervening decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 
which was "a generous application of the doctrine of comity between state and federal 
courts," not a decision on the characterization issue. /d. at 707-08. 
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law of res judicata not to "so far depart from the plain requirements 
of justice as to preclude in these circumstances a review of the fed-
eral question. "6s 
Unfortunately for Frankfurter and Prichard, they had over-
looked a more recent decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
squarely holding that its 1935 decision did not have retroactive ef-
fect.69 As a result, the Court substituted a paragraph holding that 
the plea of res judicata was not available, because the 1930 decision 
was indeed legislative (though decisions on the same issues after 
1935 were judicial). But Justice Frankfurter had another string in 
his bow. Both the initial opinion and the revised one offered an 
alternative ground for denying relief to Oklahoma Gas & Electric: 
The injunction against the enforcement of the bond violated the 
Anti-Injunction Act. Chief Justice Hughes agreed, but would have 
found it permissible directly to enjoin the enforcement of the 
rates. 70 The Court replied that a prior decision had "eliminated" 
the ratemaking commission "as a party to this action," presumably 
with the effect of making it impossible to enjoin enforcement of the 
rates.7t 
I suggest that to understand this case, we must keep in mind 
two facts. First, it was a challenge to a state agency's rate-setting, 
brought in federal court. We have already seen that the Court was 
attempting to rid the federal courts of such cases, seeing them as a 
legacy of the era of substantive economic due process. Second, de-
spite the Court's erroneous initial reliance on the retroactivity of the 
1935 case, the outcome of the case was not altered. And indeed, it 
seems to me significant that in none of the cases in which the Court 
made substantive alterations in its already-issued opinions was the 
result changed. It may be that the Justices believed, or understood, 
that they always had available to them the materials for fashioning 
the result they desired to reach, and that, therefore, on the deepest 
level, getting the details right did not really matter. n 
This, in turn, raises a final question about jurisprudence and 
68. 309 U.S. at II (Hughes, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
69. The intervening decision therefore did not "overrule" the prior one, as Prichard's 
story stated. But the details are sufficiently technical, and not that different from an overrul· 
ing, to make it understandable why Prichard, and later Schlesinger, told the story as if it 
involved an overruling. 
70. Id. at 12-13 (Hughes, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
71. Jd. at 8. 
72. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), a subsequent order cor-
rected Justice Frankfurter's description of the legislative history of the Clayton Act. 338 U.S. 
808 (1949). Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether 
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 933-37 
( 1952), argued that the correction ought to have impelled a rethinking of the underlying 
argument. (Wendy Perdue brought these references to my attention.) 
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history. If my speculation about the Justices' unconcern for detail 
is correct, it would be interesting to know whether they lacked that 
concern because they were influenced by their contemporaries, the 
Legal Realists, 73 or because the Legal Realists actually had their 
jurisprudence right. 
73. I put it this way, rather than saying that the Justices were Legal Realists, because 
virtually every Justice made some substantive revisions, and one would not want to call them 
all Legal Realists. It does seem to me that Justice Frankfurter appears in this comment 
rather more often than he ought to. Perhaps he was indeed a true Legal Realist. Or perhaps 
he was so wound up in his extrajudicial activities that he devoted less attention than his 
colleagues did to the details of the job of judging. 
